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Localising human rights law: A case-study of civil society interpretation of rights in 
Scotland 
 
Abstract  
Literature, most notably in anthropology and international law, has explored experiences and 
contributions of local-level actors in efforts to realise international human rights. This article 
contributes a new and complementary perspective to one aspect of this scholarship, on the 
localisation of international rights language. It focuses on the localisation of legal language 
in a European context. It explores claims by civil society actors about the applicability of 
legal human rights standards, drawing upon data generated during the participative mapping 
SURFHVVWKDWXQGHUSLQQHG6FRWODQG¶VILUVW1DWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV$FWLRQ3ODQ7KHDUWLFOH
provides a qualitative case-study of engagements with three particular rights ± the right to 
life, the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to respect 
for private and family life. It finds significant evidence of civil society actors using the 
language of human rights law to anchor interpretive claims about how the rights should 
apply, in a way that is prescribed, but not defined by, authoritative institutional 
interpretations. The case-study reveals how interpretive engagement with human rights law 
corresponds to a sense of entitlement to use the language of international human rights. It 
thereby contributes to a richer understanding of the drivers of, and risks to, local-level 
ownership of human rights language, highlighting insights for both scholarship and human 
rights advocacy. 
 
Keywords 
Localisation; ownership; interpretation; civil society; mapping; right to life; inhuman or 
degrading treatment; private and family life.  
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Introduction 
Questions about how different actors use human rights language to advance individual or 
collective claims speak to the relevance of supranational human rights law beyond 
institutional contexts. In recent decades such questions have most notably been critiqued in 
scholarship in anthropology and in international law. Anthropology as a discipline has seen a 
shift from a degree of scepticism about human rights to DQRWKHU³ZDYH´1 of work, which has 
included examination of the international human rights system in practice.2 One focus has 
EHHQRQSURFHVVHVRIµORFDOLVDWLRQ¶3, on KRZ³WUDQVQDWLRQDOFRQFHSWVDQGODQJXDJHDUH
deployed in their contexts of reception´.4 Alongside these perspectives, international law 
VFKRODUVKLSKDVKLJKOLJKWHGKXPDQULJKWVµIURPEHORZ¶SULPDULO\LQUHVSRQVHWReconomic 
globalisation.5 Questions about the use of human rights language have often been asked in the 
context of grassroots activism and social movements ± of ³FRXQter-FXOWXUH´.6 The focus has 
been on the use of human rights language as political discourse, predominantly based on 
studies in the Global South7 and the United States.8 Other literature from a socio-legal 
perspective has emphasised the desirability of exploring empirical realities of human rights 
implementation at the national level.9 Socio-legal literature has a strong history of 
emphasising the workings of law in practice and exploring OD\SHRSOHV¶shaping of law10, and 
it has developed a focus on international human rights law relatively recently.11 A key 
contribution of the literature across these fields has been to foreground questions of human 
rights in practice through a socio-legal lens12 and to highlight the experiences and roles of 
local actors.13  
In this article, we advocate a different and complementary direction within the 
literature by bringing together a focus on law and local-level engagement with human rights 
from a European perspective. We explore how civil society actors in Scotland invoke 
supranational (regional/international) legal standards to support claims of human rights 
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violations. Focusing on a European constitutional democracy as a site of analysis brings 
insights from a geographical and political perspective that is under-represented in current 
literature on the localisation of international human rights. This combined focus contributes 
to a richer understanding of what can animate, and what can compromise, local-level 
ownership of human rights language.  
As little is known about what local-level engagement with supranational human rights 
law looks like, including in states that might be considered to have relatively advanced levels 
of rights protection, we do not know how this kind of engagement might relate to a sense of 
entitlement to use, and ownership over, rights language. Yet this is vital. Both are elements of 
translating supranational standards into increased protection in local contexts, where rights 
matter most. Knowing more about these processes can provide insights for advocates who 
wish to tailor their interventions to promote ownership of rights language, and can inform our 
understanding of how such ownership impacts on progress towards rights realisation.  
:HIRFXVRQKRZFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVIUDPHGWKHLURZQRURWKHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVXVLQJ
the language of three legal human rights standards. The examples used, within a qualitative 
case-study approach, are the right to respect for private and family life, the right not to be 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to life. In the first section below 
we VD\PRUHDERXWULJKWVµRZQHUVKLS¶ and the significance of a focus on law. In the main 
section we outline our approach and the parameters of the research data before analysing the 
key findings. We highlight two themes for analysis: the nature and depth of claims made, and 
the extent to which these claims push the boundaries of authoritative, institutional 
interpretations. We find evidence of civil society actors using the language of human rights 
law to ground interpretive claims about how the rights should apply, in a way that is 
prescribed but not defined by institutional interpretations. This, we argue, corresponds to a 
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sophisticated sense of entitlement to use the language of human rights law. In the third 
section we bring together insights for scholarship and human rights advocacy. 
 
Rights realisation and ownership of human rights law in local contexts 
Human rights advocates suggest that local ownership of international rights language is an 
HVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQWRIµPDNLQJULJKWVUHDO¶14 $V0HUU\QRWHV³7KHLPSDFWRIKXPDQULJKWV
ODZGHSHQGVDVGRHVDOOODZRQFKDQJLQJORFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIULJKWVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV´15 
The conviction that rights-holders themselves should feel able to, and be supported in, 
³appropriating´16 their rights is evident in public outreach programs and rights education 
campaigns. It is recognised that ³[h]uman rights can only be achieved through an informed 
and continued demand by people for their protection´.17 The UN promotes human rights 
education, including through campaigns around particular treaties.18 It gives a special role to 
national human rights institutions (NHRIs), seen as bridges between national contexts and the 
UN/regional systems. Both demonstrate the importance it gives to reaching out to the public 
to promote human rights. Congruent with the emphasis placed on appropriating rights 
language is the individual empowerment inherent in the conceptualisation of the liberal, 
rights-bearing subject; a conceptualisation that has been argued to underpin the modern 
human rights regime.19 Human rights differ from other kinds of legal rights in this symbolic 
prominence that they give to the empowerment aspect of the holding and claiming of rights 
against the state. A sense of entitlement to claim, and ownership over, supranational human 
rights language is seen as essential. At the moment, however, we do not know enough about 
how entitlement and ownership are impacted by engagement with human rights law.   
Examining engagement with law can help to answer conceptual and practical 
questions about ownership of rights language because law is the backbone of the human 
rights regime as it has taken shape internationally over the past seventy years. The centrality 
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RI³tyrannosaurus lex´20 within the international human rights system has rightly been 
critiqued, and the legal formulation of rights is but one aspect of a broader conceptualisation 
of human rights as a transnational discursive practice21, but at the same time rights-advocates 
call upon the legal standards. These standards hold the possibility of official stamps of 
validity22, accountability23, and remedies.24 7KHSURPLVHRIODZ¶VSURWHFWLRQUHPDLQV
attractive.25  
To explore engagement with human rights law we draw upon data generated during 
the participative, multi-VWDNHKROGHUSURFHVVWKDWSURYLGHGWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHIRU6FRWODQG¶V
first National Human Rights Action Plan. This process, led by an NHRI, the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission (SHRC), aimed to capture the perspectives of rights-holders, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and academics on good practice and gaps in respect of the range of 
internationally recognised human rights. National processes of mapping evidence of rights 
realisation to underpin action plans is a relatively new and developing context.26 This is not a 
context of contentious disputes; instead it invites, because of its consultative, participative, 
evidence-gathering nature, micro-level engagements with the meaning and scope of particular 
rights.  
In this context we can explore how different actors engage with human rights law ± an 
approach that does not detract from buWFRPSOHPHQWVVRPHRIWKHOHVV³juro-centric´27 
approaches to exploring processes of human rights localisation. Our question is, how did 
participants in ScoWODQG¶VSURFHVVXVHthe language of human rights law to frame assertions 
about gaps in respect for rights?  
 
The Case-study: Human rights law in the Scottish mapping process 
Approach to the data 
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We explore how participants in the mapping engaged with the meaning of the rights to 
respect for private/family life, freedom from inhuman/degrading treatment, and the right to 
life by examining what they say about, and the kinds of circumstances that they link to, these 
particular standards. Participative baseline mapping processes provide interesting material for 
analysing a wide range of questions. For example, how often participants engage with the 
process without using the term human rights at all or without referencing human rights in a 
legal way; which category of participants are most or least likely to invoke rights (including 
in a legal way); and whether the nature of the language used by participants impacts upon the 
likelihood of their contributions being picked up by the NHRI. Presently, however, we 
intentionally adopt a different focus LQRUGHUWROHDUQDERXWWKHG\QDPLFVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
interaction with law in this unique context. We aim to better understand the implications 
thereof for the phenomenon of ownership of the language of human rights law.  
We selected the rights to respect for private/family life, freedom from 
inhuman/degrading treatment, and the right to life for inclusion in the case-study. We sought 
standards composed of distinctive legal rights language, which would allow us to efficiently 
identify relevant engagements within the data; we sought rights that were included in the 
domestic legal framework of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights28; and we sought rights composed of terms/ideas that were emotive and 
potentially familiar to a wide range of participants who were not necessarily legal experts. 
Whilst several other rights were considered (and would be interesting to analyse in future 
research, including socio-economic rights), we deemed the chosen standards, and the 
selection of three different examples, to embody the appropriate balance between time 
constraints of the study and its objectives.  
We undertake a qualitative case-study of two existing data-sets, which represent key 
points in the exercise of mapping rights realisation in Scotland. They provide direct insight 
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into how rights were discussed by a wide range of individuals and groups, whether they 
specialised in rights protection and promotion or not.  
 
Table 1: Data format and source  
  
A 
Collected transcripts and records 
 
B 
Consultation responses 
Data format  Transcribed consultation-event 
discussions, interviews, and focus 
groups.  
Compilation of written consultation 
responses. 
 
Source Individuals, civil society 
organisations.29 
Civil society organisations, 
individuals, political actors, public 
sector organisations. 
 
 
The first data-set (A) is a collection of transcripts and records of consultation 
events/interviews conducted between summer 2011 and summer 2012. This data-set shows 
participants giving accounts of personal experiences, as well as referring to experiences of 
others that they have encountered through activism, which they believe to be incompatible 
with respect for human rights. These records cover ten one-to-one interviews, thirteen events, 
and twelve focus groups, held across Scotland with a variety of stakeholders. The second 
data-set (B) is a comprehensive collection RIFRQVXOWDWLRQUHVSRQVHVµ,ndividual and 
Organisation Responses¶, submitted during a five-month participation period following 
publication of a report in October 2012 by the SHRC summarising three-years of evidence 
gathering.30 The consultation addressed two questions: ³1. Based on the evidence presented 
in the report Getting it right? Human rights in Scotland, or your own experience, what do you 
consider to be the most urgent human rights issues which VKRXOGEHDGGUHVVHGLQ6FRWODQG¶V
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National Action Plan for Human Rights?; 2. What specific and achievable actions do you 
consider would best address the concerns you identify LQ\RXUUHVSRQVHWRTXHVWLRQ"´.  
In the analysis, participants are anonymised or identified by name depending on the 
data source and the permissions obtained by the SHRC (which included permissions for the 
data to be reused). In order to maintain the confidentiality that was assured when seeking 
consent to participate, the identities of individuals and groups involved in the consultation 
events (A) were protected. All groups were informed about the project in writing prior to the 
focus groups and interviews and key contacts were asked to provide this information to their 
group members. In order to ensure informed consent, this information was again provided in 
writing and explained to each participant and interviewee prior to the focus group or 
interview commencing. Below, we identify participants by a descriptor, mirroring the source 
documents. Each group/individual referenced in data-set (B) consented in writing to their 
responses being published.  
In conducting the analysis, we made a decision about keyword terms and compiled a 
list of instances of these in each data-set. The keywords differ depending on the right in 
question. In order to maximise capture of relevant references, we accounted for variations in 
how we anticipated participants might use the language. In respect of the right to life, we 
searched for the precise phrase, whereas in respect of the right to respect for private and 
IDPLO\OLIHZHVHDUFKHGVHSDUDWHO\IRUµSULYDWHOLIH¶DQGµIDPLO\OLIH¶DVZHOODVµSULYDF\¶DQG
in respect of the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, we searched 
PRUHEURDGO\XVLQJWKHNH\ZRUGVµLQKXPDQ*¶DQGµGHJUDG¶:H individually examined all 
references returned in the context of the surrounding text and noted emerging themes. We re-
examined the relevant parts of the data and jointly compiled an unstructured list of initial 
points of interest. We again re-examined the relevant parts of the data alongside this list and 
manually coded the data, resulting in the grouping and labelling of a number of categories. 
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We considered these categories alongside the initial, flexible themes that we had previously 
identified and confirmed or modified the themes accordingly.  
We acknowledge our own role in interpreting particiSDQWV¶ZD\VRIWDONLQJDERXWWKH
rights in this case-study. Our previous knowledge of the law plays a role, given that we are 
asking how participants use the language of the rights. Seeing the data through our own 
perspectives ± a combination of academic knowledge, of community legal practice 
experience, and of being close to the evidence-JDWKHULQJSURFHVVDVDPHPEHURIWKH6+5&¶V
Research Advisory Group and as its former Communications and Outreach Officer31) ± does 
not, in our view, create any conflict with the analysis presented here. We have aimed to 
manage any potential bias through a reflexive approach.32  
 
Overview of results 
Table 2: Search results 
 Privacy/private 
life/family life 
 
Inhuman*/degrad* 
 
Right to life 
 
Combined  
 
Total returns 
73 39 11 123 
 
Number of 
exclusions 
2733 2234 535 54 
 
Number 
analysed  
46 17 6 69 
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Table 2 presents an overview of the search results. We do not focus on how often the 
keywords arise; instead we consider in depth how civil society actors use the terms. Of the 
one hundred and twenty-three total returns, for the three rights considered across both data-
sets, we excluded fifty-four. We determined exclusions according to several criteria, 
including, for example, irrelevant uses of the terms. At this stage we also excluded from 
analysis invocations WKDWZHLGHQWLILHGDVQDWXUDOLVWLFRUµQRQ-OHJDOLVWLF¶, uses of the search 
terms, given our focus on legal language.36 We excluded only eight out of the total of fifty-
four exclusions on this basis; the vast majority of exclusions were for other reasons.37 We 
erred on the side of caution in making these determinations, so as to avoid including in the 
analysis those references that may have been, but were not indisputably, a use of legalistic 
language. For example, in a focus group discussion a participant with experience of working 
in care homes XVHVWKHWHUPµGHJUDGLQJ¶LQGHVFULELQJKLVFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDUH
of older persons. Recounting his experiences, he describes it as degrading for the women in 
the home that he, a man, was the only person designated to help them to the toilet.38 His 
description of the unacceptable circumstances might be evidence of incidental engagement 
with a legal human rights term or it might be evidence of his awareness of the legal frame 
within which the consultation is taking place. Similarly, in another group a participant 
describes as µGHJUDGLQJ¶ a situation in which disabled persons had been required to give their 
weight and the weight of their wheelchair when booking taxi services.39 Again, this might 
reflect that the context of consulting about the state of rights realisation presented a human 
rights law frame and so implicitly validated the use of this language if participants were 
familiar with it. This is plausible and would be interesting to explore in a different context. 
Presently, we err on the side of caution and exclude such references from analysis.  
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We analyse sixty-nine legalistic uses of the terms. These terms are used by twenty-six 
different participants ± individuals, CSOs, political actors and public bodies. These legalistic 
references include examples such as:  
 
Children and young people, older people and people with disabilities who use care, 
support and social work services, have a right to life, freedom from torture, inhumane 
or degrading treatment or punishment >«@40 
 
An organisational respondent, referring to work with black and minority ethnic communities, 
writes:  
 
[Children and young people] face yet another layer of inequality preventing them 
from realizing many human rights as set out in the UNCRC, UN Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention (right to life, security of person, to play, 
to a safe home, to not face torture, degradation, etc).41 
 
Another organisational respondent advocates a health and social care integration approach 
that:  
 
>«@ UHVSHFWVSHRSOH¶VULJKWWRSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\OLIHDQGVWULYHVWRHQDEOHSHRSOHWR
be included as citizens who enjoy the right to independent living.42 
 
In such examples, participants plainly engage with rights language in a legalistic way. Further 
examples will be seen in the analysis.  
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 We explore two key themes: the depth and reach of legalistic claims; and the extent 
to which claims are implicitly or explicitly descriptive of already-existing authoritative 
interpretations, or are prescriptive of new directions in the scope of the rights. Embedded in 
these themes are insights about how local actors engage with, navigate, and appropriate the 
language of legal standards.   
 
The nature of legalistic claims 
The language of rights might be invoked in different ways. Goodale, in research on rights 
discourse in Bolivia, describes how rights language might be used in connotative or 
denotative ways, echoing a distinction commonly found in philosophy, linguistics and 
semiotics, and cultural theory.43 Human rights have connotative power when individuals or 
JURXSV³JHVWXUHWRZDUG´EURDG human rights ideas; they have denotative power when 
individuals or groups invoke specific standards.44 Legalistic uses of rights language are 
inherently denotative. But denotative claims can themselves be more or less specific and 
more or less developed: they might lean towards being superficially legalistic or they might 
be more interpretive (i.e. making and justifying connections to specific experiences). The 
nature of the legalistic uses of rights language is a key theme in the data. The majority of 
participants, in relation to all three case-study rights, refer to those rights in ways that develop 
connections to specific circumstances.  
 One respondent who refers to WKH³ULJKWWRIDPLO\OLIH´OLQNVLWVSHFLILFDOO\WRchanges 
in immigration rules relating to income thresholds and settlement of non-national partners of 
migrant workers, and highlights the impact of these rules on family unification:  
 
A threshold of £18,600 rising to £22,400 for one child with an extra £2,400 for each 
additional child, places a substantial income bar on the right to family life.45   
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In other responses, participants make specific connections to the right to respect for private 
and family life that include inadequate support and assessment of parental capacity46; lack of 
access to housing and discrimination on the basis of age in the private housing market47; lack 
of options for intersex people to adopt children48; lack of independent legal representation for 
sexual offence complainers;49 insufficient attention to securing emotional nurture for looked-
after children and young people50DQGXVHRID³PRVTXLWR´GHYLFHE\WKHSROLFHVHUYLFHDVDQ
anti-social behaviour management tool.51 All of these are linked to legalistic references to the 
right. In relation to the right to life, in one instance a link is made to fuel poverty and failure 
of governmental intervention52; in another example a participant states:  
  
I believe that the issue of homeless people should be addressed in Scotland. It is quite 
a common thing to see around the streets in Edinburgh even in the harsher months of 
winter time. To this extent, a socio-economic dimension of the right to life should be 
taken into account.53 
 
These are clear examples of views about what the scope of the right to life should encompass. 
In relation to the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, participants 
make connections that act to justify that specific harms merit this particular label. One 
respondent, criticising a National Health Service practice of sending patients to England for 
treatment, writes:  
 
This means continuing to send people in severe pain on 1,000 mile return journeys 
>«@VXUHO\EUHDFKLQJ³GHJUDGLQJDQGLQKXPDQHWUHDWPHQW´VWLSXODWLRQV54 
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Such engagements indicate a sense of entitlement to make claims about what these rights 
should mean. 
Some participants, particularly in relation to inhuman/degrading treatment, elaborate 
LQDZD\WKDWIXUWKHUMXVWLILHVDVLWXDWLRQ¶VSHUFHLYHGKXPDQULJKWVLPSOLFDWLRQV 
 
Chronic pain devastates lives. People can, despite the conditions from which they 
suffer, have reasonable, functional lives ± it is long-term pain that wrecks the person. 
This is what forces sufferers to give up their jobs; many plunge into poverty, some 
lose their homes and social lives. Marriages or partnerships often split, as suffering 
constant or regular pain affects personalities.55  
 
Other respondents who directly invoke inhuman/degrading treatment also justify a link by 
expanding upon the characteristics of particular experiences:  
 
>«@ZHNQRZWKDWGHJUDGLQJDQGLQKXPDQWUHDWPHQWDQGEHLQJSXQLVKHGIRUWKLQJV
that no other citizen would be punished for are common in care settings and through 
the care systems. People with learning disabilities, especially in care settings but 
sometimes in family homes with informal carers, are kept in a child-like, dependent, 
state; being told what they must do, having to ask permission for nearly everything 
they do and punished if they disobey the sometimes complicated rules they have to 
follow. This is not the experience of everyone but it happens to people with learning 
disabilities much more often than to any other citizen and is acknowledged by most 
research and investigation.56  
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>«@,KDYHEHHQDFDUHURIIDPLO\PHPEHrs in the psychiatric system, in particular my 
youngest son who received dehumanising treatment as a patient of [an Intensive 
Psychiatric Care Unit] in February 2012, where he was locked in a seclusion room 
without a toilet or water to drink, for hours on end, with a broken hand, and had to 
defecate on the floor. Patients were not allowed pens to write with and had to ask for 
water to drink.57 
 
Such examples highlight characteristics of harm, including attacks on personality and mental 
suffering caused by claims of loss of social connections, destitution, infantilisation, poor 
sanitary conditions, and inadequate medical attention. These claims assert sophisticated 
connections between particular circumstances and WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VJURXS¶VYLHZVRIZKDW the 
prohibition of inhuman/degrading treatment should encompass. We speculate that a tendency 
to make very detailed claims might reflect a strong sense of emotional connection, leading to 
a stronger sense of confidence in making more elaborate claims, or alternatively a lesser 
familiarity with the right, which might increase a perceived need to make more detailed 
claims. The extent of detail given in relation to different rights likely also depends on whether 
participants links to several issues or expands on only one issue. This is speculative; the 
number of references analysed, and our focus on what was said rather than how often, does 
not allow us to infer an explanation for the greater evidence of particularly detailed claims in 
relation to inhuman/degrading treatment. Although in lesser proportion, detailed claims were 
also present elsewhere in the data. For example, one organisation states:  
 
>«@ one of the most high-profile ways that victims of crime have their rights to 
private and family life violated is by the media. >«@Regularly outside courthouses 
ZHVHHµPHGLDVFUXPV¶SKRWRJUDSKLQJDQGILOPLQJYLFWLPVDQGZLWQHVVHVDWWHnding 
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court; these images can be and are widely broadcast without the consent of the 
victims. Once there has been a public trial, the media can ± and do ± use images of 
victims to illustrate further stories without the consent of the victims often many years 
afterwards.58  
 
This participant continues with an illustrative example of the experience of one family. 
Across the contributions there is significant evidence of particular links being made to 
particular rights.  
Such engagements are more than superficial invocations of rights language. They go 
PXFKIXUWKHUWKDQ³DOOXVLYHUHIHUHQFHWRWKHLGHDRIKXPDQULJKWV´.59 They are claims that the 
language of a right, expressed in broad terms and fluid in its meaning, should encompass 
particular experiences situated in particular localities. They can be described as extra-judicial 
interpretations60 of human rights law. Extra-judicial interpreters are any actors, beyond 
judicial/quasi-judicial institutions, who make claims about how the words within a legal 
standard should be fleshed out into concrete protections (even if the idea of interpretation in 
human rights law is overwhelmingly associated with formal contexts of monitoring and 
adjudication).61 Indeed it is extra-judicial interpretation that drives initial institutional 
engagement with the scope of a right. As De Feyter reminds us, rights are given life through 
claims anchored in local sites of harm where rights-holders actually experience what they 
perceive to be violations.62 Interpretive claims link experiences to rights standards, generating 
new understandings of those rights. The advantage of understanding claims in the case-study 
as interpretations is that it emphasises that they connect specific lived experience to specific 
legal rights.  
Integral to the possibility of interpretive claim-making is a sense of entitlement to 
engage in this way with the legal standards. This is the key point. Interpretive claims rest 
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upon an integral, underpinning appropriation of the legal language. This is so even if not 
consciously articulated. By their nature, claims that attempt to give substance, through 
specific connections, to the sometimes broad and always fluid text of a legal standard must be 
founded upon a sense of prerogative to talk about human rights law in this way. When 
interpretive claims are voiced, a sense of entitlement is inherent.   
To reiterate, we focus on how the language was used. We cannot, in any case, know 
from this data why interpretive claims were made. Here, we draw out two insights concerning 
knowledge and context, which are relevant to understanding the ways in which interpretive 
claims were made.  
Firstly, knowledge of supranational human rights law language was widely spread and 
certainly not exclusive to the NHRI. :HVHHVRPHRI0HUU\¶Vinsights, from research on the 
interrelation between local activism and transnational human rights fora, playing out here at a 
more micro-level and in this slightly narrower context of engagement with legal language. 
Merry identifies a category of intermediary translators (³QDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOHOLWHVKXPDQULJKWV
lawyers, feminist activists and movement leaders, social workers and other service providers, 
DQGDFDGHPLFV´63, who occupy a middle ground, facilitating linkages between international 
rights discourse and local experiences. There are echoes of these insights. The voices of some 
of these kinds of actors are present in our case-study; for example, one participant self-
identifies as a human rights lawyer, there is an academic-led group, and there are individuals 
who we infer are activists. Some participants might see themselves as µWUDQVODWLQJ¶SDFNDJLQJ
RWKHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHVLQWRD³PHWD-ODQJXDJH´64 (as observed in socio-legal research) of human 
rights. There are examples, although very limited, in which participants refer to their internal 
consultations which fed into the mapping process.65 There are also differences: In our case-
study, there are participants who make interpretive legalistic claims who could not be 
described as activists, and so on; the range of those using the language of supranational 
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human rights law is broad, from local authorities to youth organisations, to small groups close 
to the grassroots as well as non-affiliated individuals. Also, even if some participants see 
themselves as ³navigating a divide´66, it would seem to be between those for whom they 
advocate and the NHRI/duty-bearer audience, rather than transnational fora. There is no 
explicit evidence of any having one foot in the supranational arena (for some, such as a local 
authority, this seems unlikely), although the experience of individuals (including within 
organisations) could be important. What we do see, is not a physical foot in the camp of 
supranational fora, but a knowledge connection to supranational (in particular, regional) 
human rights law. The consultative mapping context, with the focus on supranational human 
rights law, is a different frame of engagement and yet we see VRPHRI0HUU\¶VLnsights 
reflected therein, with a variation on the kinds of knowledge and the location this knowledge. 
In summary, a range of different kinds of actors had sufficient knowledge of human rights 
law language to be able to invoke it as part of interpretive claims.   
 Secondly, the legal language tended not to be used in conjunction with demands for 
judicial remedies. In the written consultation responses there is some appeal to adjudicatory 
or legislative solutions67 EXWLQUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQµ:KDWVSHFLILFDQGDFKLHYDEOH
actions do you consider would best address the concerns you identify in your response >«@"¶
participants suggested barriers in the form of funding,68 policy framework gaps69, lack of 
community and individual engagement70, and a need for awareness-raising amongst service 
providers71, rights-holders72, and the public.73 This policy-orientated approach indicates that 
participants had a keen appreciation of the political/attitudinal/financial barriers to remedying 
perceived violations in the local landscape. That the use of legalistic language does not 
WUDQVODWHLQWRWKHµMXGLFLDOLVDWLRQ¶RIUHPHGLHVVRXJKW shows participants taking a selective 
approach to the way they used law to ground claims ± they presumably saw the invocation of 
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legal standards as useful for influencing duty-bearers to remove non-legal barriers to rights-
realisation. Legalistic interpretive claims did not imply a demand for judicialised remedies.  
In summary, there is evidence of individuals/CSOs making interpretive connections 
between particular circumstances and views of what the rights should encompass. We have 
suggested that this kind of engagement is integrated with a sense of entitlement to invoke 
legal human rights language; interpretive claim-making and this sense of entitlement coexist. 
Logically, interpretive claims also coincide with knowledge of legal language, and this was 
evidenced in the range of different kinds of actors, not restricted to a top-tier of experts, who 
used the language of the case-study rights. CLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUV¶engagement with legal 
language tended to be accompanied by demands, not for legal remedies, but for 
accountability outside of the legal sphere. This indicates that interpreters had an appreciation 
of how the legal standards might usefully be invoked locally. Knowledge of these standards 
then, was placed within the local policy/practice context.  
 
 
The influence of authoritative interpretations  
If local actors interpret rights, this raises questions about how these interpretations interact 
with authoritative interpretations. De Feyter and Parmentier, in their introduction to The 
Local Relevance of Human Rights, note this book¶VFRQFHUQ with whether local invocations of 
ULJKWV³FRLQFLGHG´ZLWK³OHJDOGHILQLWLRQ>V@´.74 A key theme found in the mapping data ± 
which is an extension of the first examined above ± is the extent to which participants who 
make assertions about the applicability of the rights do so in a way that mirrors or exceeds 
judicially-sanctioned fields of application. That is, the extent to which they, implicitly or 
explicitly, defer to fields of application that have been institutionally recognised (by national 
courts or by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the most immediate sources of 
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human rights law in the UK in respect of the case-study rights), or entail more radical claims 
that challenge current boundaries of applicability of the rights. To take the example of 
inhuman/degrading treatment, an instance of the former type of claim might be rules 
governing maximum cell occupancy and hygiene provision for prisoners in state detention, 
and of the latter, rules governing the withdrawal of state social security benefits on the basis 
of missed appointments regarding out-of-work benefits. In the data analysed, participants 
tend to show prescriptive, but not radical ways of talking about the rights and their 
applicability.  
This is seen in a claim relating to a gap in protection of the right to respect for family 
life ± inadequate support and assessment of capacity for parents with learning disabilities.75 
The ECtHR, in 2017, found a violation of Article 8 ECHR due to a VWDWH¶V failure to take 
adequate steps to facilitate contact with a hearing-impaired parent.76 Seen in this light, the 
claim put forward at the time of the evidence-gathering (2012/13) concerning parents with 
learning disabilities appears to be an expansive and progressive understanding of the scope of 
the right. The organisation putting forward this interpretive link shows awareness of case-law 
linked to the ECHR (and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities77). 
Another respondent, referring also to family life, links it to options for intersex people to 
adopt children.78 This pushes WKHERXQGDULHVRIWKHULJKW¶VDSSOLFDELOLW\EH\RQGestablished 
fields of recognition of transsexual identities and adoption of children by homosexual 
couples.79 Similarly, one organisation describes minimum financial requirements imposed by 
immigration rules as incongruent with respect for family life. There was at the time broad 
civil society criticism of the rules, which were only later challenged judicially.80 Other 
examples are diverse: from a lack of independent legal representation for sexual offence 
complainers81, to sharing of information amongst professionals about young people in the 
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care of the state82. Despite this diversity, it is notable how often participants make claims that 
were at that time not quite radical, yet still prescriptive.     
Similar claims are seen in respect of the other rights. For example, the treatment of 
persons with autism spectrum disorders within the mental health system is described by one 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDVWUHDWPHQWWKDWFRXOG³XQGRXEWHGO\EHFDWHJRULVHGDVFUXHOLQKXPDQDQG
degrading treatment >«@´83 This claim shows an extension of the officially-mandated scope 
of meaning of this right. From a European human rights law perspective, in this phase of the 
mapping process the treatment of persons with disabilities had only recently been highlighted 
as a field of application, as interpreted by the ECtHR in Stanev v. Bulgaria84 and ĈRUÿHYLü v. 
Croatia.85 The Article 3 aspect of the former case concerned the living conditions of a man 
diagnosed with schizophrenia within a social care institution, and the latter, persistent 
harassment of a man with mental and physical disabilities by private persons. The 
respondents make no explicit reference to any national, European, or international decisions. 
Another group does make reference to the ĈRUÿHYLü decision in the context of a claim 
concerning disability-related hate-crime:  
 
>«@some hate crimes will reach the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which is prohibited under Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
In the recent case of Dordevic v Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights found 
that acts of harassment taken in their entirety may breach the threshold of Article 3 
DQGWKDW&URDWLDIDLOHGWRSURWHFWWKLVULJKWEHFDXVH³1RVHULRXVDWWHPSWZDVPDGHWR
assess the true nature of the situation complained of, and to assess the lack of a 
systematic approach which resulted in the absence of adequate and comprehensive 
PHDVXUHV´86  
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Another participant UHIHUVWRWKHVFRSHRI³IUHHGRPIURPGHJUDGLQJWUHDWPHQW´LQUHODWLRQWR
male domestic abuse. This right had at that time been used in the ECHR system to widen 
VWDWHV¶GXWLHVLQrespect of violence against women.87 Similarly, a participant who refers to 
Scottish Gypsy Travellers invokes the ³right not to be tortured or inhumanly or degradingly 
WUHDWHGRUSXQLVKHG´DQGFRQWLQXHV³7KLVLQFOXGHVOLYLQJLQVXEVWDQGDUGRUVTXDOLGFRQGLtions 
VXFKDVWKRVHLQYROYLQJµVORSSLQJRXW¶RUOLYLQJRQWKHURDGVLGHZLWKQREDVLFVHUYLFH
provision. Many Scottish Gypsy Travellers are living in such conditions´88 This is a 
prescriptive connection to officially recognised fields of application ± situations of 
destitution89 and inadequate sanitation in detention (tKHUHIHUHQFHWRµVORSSLQJRXW¶LVDQ
implicit reference to a Scottish court decision in Napier v. Scottish Ministers, which found a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR).90 Interaction with authoritative interpretations is also reflected 
in claims related to the right to life, in which it is linked to homelessness in Scotland and to 
fuel poverty.91 In the examples highlighted there are different degrees of implicit or explicit 
reference to existing official interpretations.  
 To the best of our knowledge these are claims that expanded recognised fields of 
application of the rights. These participants make connections between particular experiences 
and the legal rights in a way that pushes the boundaries of the rights¶ interpretation, yet in a 
way that resonates with their existing stages of interpretive development. These are claims 
that are neither ambitiously prescriptive, nor purely descriptive. We might have expected 
participants to appeal to the visionary capacity of rights; their claims being characterised 
more by aspiration than official judicial understandings. However, none of the interpretations 
of the case-study rights could be described as radical.  
Here again we can draw out two insights concerning knowledge and context, relevant 
to understanding the nature of these claims.  
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A tendency towards balance between description and prescription indicates diffuse 
human rights knowledge. Where interpretations by courts are not explicitly invoked, but 
where claims nevertheless tend towards non-radical extensions of DFRXUW¶VH[LVWLQJDSSURDFK
this balance could have been coincidental. It is more likely, we argue, that is reveals tacit 
knowledge. That is, knowledge circulating within the local advocacy culture of the kinds of 
things that the rights µRIILFLDOO\¶SURWHFWHGDJDLQVW.  
A tendency towards balance also shows that human rights law language was used in a 
measured way. Claims are not far-fetched; they tend to be ³SODXVLEOH´.92 Arguably, this is a 
reflection of the nature and objectives of the mapping process. The mapping was intended to 
underpin achievable change by national duty-bearers. Claims that were plausible had a 
greater chance of being taken seriously. On the one hand, this kind of measured invocation of 
human rights law might result in a loss of radical potential.93 It might constrain the possibility 
of cutting-edge extra-judicial interpretations. Such interpretations are important because 
local-level experiences motivate legal change. On the other hand, this kind of measured use 
of human rights law might be positive from the perspective of longer-term ownership of 
rights language. There is perhaps a greater probability that such claims will be acted upon. 
Merry highlights the significance of this as an aspect of fostering human rights 
empowerment. The possibility of implementationVKHDUJXHVLV³IXQGDPHQWDOWRHVWDEOLVKLQJ
human rights consciousneVV´94 And not just the possibility of implementation, but the 
possibility of official responsiveness: discussing the vulnerability of nascent individual rights 
consciousness, Merry finds WKDW³RQO\LIWKHUHLVLQVWLWXWLRQDOVXSSRUWIRUWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHZLOl 
this new subjectivity be sustained.´95 This point resonates in the current context. Although 
the claim-recipients in MeUU\¶VUHVHDUFKRQZRPHQ¶VULJKWVLQ+DZDL¶L)96 are primarily state 
authorities, this finding seems relevant when the recipients are a public actor like an NHRI. 
0HUU\¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDOWKRXJKLQUHVSHFWRILQGLYLGXDOVDQGQRWRUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHUHOHYDQW
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³,I>«@FODLPVDUHWUHDWHGDVXQLPSRUWDQWXQUHDVRQDEOHRULQVLJQLILFDQWWKH\DUHOHVVOLNHO\ 
WRWDNHDULJKWVDSSURDFKWRWKHLUSUREOHPV´DQGYLFHYHUVD97 Potential disengagement can 
result if claims are dismissed as implausible. In this sense, making claims that are influenced, 
but not determined, by authoritative institutional interpretations can be seen as paradoxical, 
by constraining interpretive freedom at the same time as supporting interpretive ownership. 
In summary, actors invoking the case-study rights did not use the process as a forum 
for radical creativity. This suggests official understandings of the rights were navigated based 
on either explicit or tacit knowledge circulating within the local advocacy culture. From the 
perspective of fostering a sense of entitlement to appropriate the language of rights, a 
tendency towards making plausible interpretive claims gives rise to some perils, but also 
promise.  
 
 
The role of NHRIs  
The case-study shows civil society actors in Scotland using human rights law to anchor but 
not define interpretive claims. We have explained this kind of engagement with reference to a 
diffuse circulation of knowledge about legal standards, placed within the local context. We 
argue that this kind of legalistic interpretative engagement with the open language of rights is 
bound up with a sense of entitlement to make claims about how they should be understood 
and why they should apply in particular contexts. As such, it can be conducive to promoting a 
sense of local-level ownership of rights language.  
 These findings are relevant to the work of NHRIs (and other rights-promoting 
organisations) and highlight space for new perspectives. They urge NHRIs to consider their 
potentially positive role in supporting engagement with law. The findings suggest that the 
participative consultation process in Scotland encouraged the making of interpretive claims. 
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Not only were participants asked for their views on how rights were being undermined, but 
the SHRC explicitly tied the mapping exercise to supranational legal standards. It observed 
during the process that rights-KROGHUV¶NQRZOHGJHRI³KXPDQULJKWVODZVDQGSULQFLSOHV´
would be a key driver of local-level appeals to human rights.98 Such an approach may have 
encouraged participants to appropriate the legal language. This is exemplified in a comment 
PDGHE\RQHLQWHUYLHZHH³,ZDVORRNLQJDWWKLVODVWQLJKWWKLVIUHHGRPIURPGHJUDGLQJ
WUHDWPHQW>«@´99 It is possible that the SHRC¶VDSSURDFKRIOLQNing to supranational 
standards, in a participative process, contributed to a culture in which the language of human 
ULJKWVODZZDVµXSIRUJUDEV¶  
Whilst NHRIs might be comfortable using human rights law as a framework, they 
should also consider the potential benefits in concrete interactions. There may be a perception 
that talking about law will alienate rather than encourage local-level ownership, but our 
findings do not support this. There may be a perception that talking about law means 
favouring snail-pace judicial remedies that might never materialise, but our findings indicate 
that a legalistic approach can be bound up with a sense of entitlement to use rights language 
without being bound up with a focus on judicialised remedies. Further, rights-promoting 
organisations should continue to seek strategies for supporting local actors who want to 
develop legalistic interpretive claims. One such strategy might be to cultivate a greater 
engagement with the actual meaning of human rights language. In the case-study it is striking 
that participants do not make any reference to the meaning of the words themselves: 
µSULYDF\¶µSULYDWH¶µIDPLO\¶µLQKXPDQ¶µGHJUDGLQJ¶RUµOLIH¶ We might have expected 
participants to express a sense of emotional identification, which would translate into a focus 
on ideas like the essence of family, personal autonomy, inferiority or humiliation. Instead, 
they talk about the rights in a way that focuses on their applicability. This might be because 
they are reticent to engage in µinappropriate¶ emotional ways with the terms of the rights. 
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However this might be explained, the findings show that participants were not openly 
motivated by the meaning of the words, yet the value-base of rights language is a potential 
resource.100 Adding an element of more direct engagement with meanings of ideas like 
humiliation or personal integrity101 and so on, could support a sense of entitlement because 
ideas like these are often intuitively understood. Doing so could also provide NHRIs with a 
different perspective from which to navigate institutional interpretations ± it is generally 
accepted that such organisations should communicate human rights law to the public in 
simple ways102, but this need not mean rights standards should be devoid of conceptual 
substance or reduced to a series of authoritative examples.  
The findings suggest that NHRIs and similar bodies should be aware of how they 
themselves understand the scope of rights. If they judge the appropriateness of new directions 
LQDULJKW¶VPHDQLQJSULPDULO\ZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRDXWKRULWDWLYHLQWHUSUHWations, they risk stifling 
civil society innovation. Ambitious claims give impetus to new institutional interpretations, 
and support longer-term advances in protection. When faced with new interpretations, NHRIs 
should be alive to a risk of too readily dismissing certain interpretations as far-fetched. Baxi 
cautions that ³WKHIOXLGLW\DPELJXLW\RIKXPDQULJKWVQRUPVDQGVWDQGDUGV´FDQ³IRVWHU
patterns of human rights silencing [«@´103; some interpretations will be seen to count while 
others will not. To avoid undermining ownership of rights language, NHRIs should reflect on 
their receptiveness to new interpretations.  
In light of the case-study, the question of how NHRIs engage with law, when 
navigating between institutional and aspirational understandings of rights, promoting 
empowerment of rights-holders and accountability of duty-bearers104, seems significant to the 
success of their objective of improving local rights ownership. There is space to integrate this 
question into the vibrant literature on NHRI effectiveness and impact.105 This question moves 
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beyond concern with what has been described as WKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI³H[FHVVLYHOHJDOLVP´106 in 
the practice of NHRIs, to re-inject a different kind of focus on law.  
  
 
Conclusion 
We have aimed to provide a new perspective on the relevance of human rights norms to the 
localisation scholarship. We have focused on a denotative form of engagement with human 
rights law in the unique context of an NHRI-led baseline mapping process in Scotland. This 
process provided a forum in which local actors were invited to express a view on how the 
often-fluid language of supranational human rights law should connect to experiences on the 
ground. The case-study thereby contributes to an understanding of localisation processes. It 
evidences the making of legalistic interpretive claims within a multi-level knowledge context, 
embedded in a local policy and practice landscape. It suggests that these legalistic interpretive 
engagements are bound up with a sense of entitlement to use the language of rights.  
We have highlighted how our findings reflect some elements of, and complement, two 
of 0HUU\¶VNH\LQVLJKWV (in relation to intermediary translators and WKHLPSDFWRIDXWKRULWLHV¶
responses on the stability of rights consciousness) and the case-study itself reflects an 
underpinning understanding of local civil society actors as valid interpreters of human rights. 
<QJYHVVRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWODZ¶VHVVHQFH³LVQRWVLPSO\LQYHQWHGDWthe top but is 
WUDQVIRUPHGFKDOOHQJHGDQGUHLQYHQWHGLQORFDOSUDFWLFHV>«@´107, relies upon a 
³G\QDPLF´108 view of how law shapes and is shaped by local engagements, in a way that is 
consonant with the work of international lawyers and legal anthropologists like Baxi, 
Rajagopal, Goodale and Merry. Although law may not invade all facets of human rights 
discourse109, the case-VWXG\UHYHDOVODZ¶Vanchoring quality, which is seen in the way 
participants talk about the rights. To conceive of engagements with the scope of meaning of 
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rights as forms of interpretation shines a different kind of light on local-level interactions 
with human rights norms. None of the actors that we identify as interpreters of the case-study 
rights self-identify in this way, and, as noted earlier, the idea of human rights interpretation 
has tended to be reserved for institutional bodies. Yet an advantage of an interpretive 
perspective on localisation questions is that it recalls the status of local-level rights-holders as 
WKH³RULJLQDU\´110 creators of rights, and is symbolic of the empowerment of rights advocates 
as legitimate interpreters of those rights. This in turn highlights that although the right to 
know about human rights standards may be DIRXQGDWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVµOLWHUDF\¶111RQH¶s 
sense of entitlement to say what a right should mean goes further. This is an aspect of local-
level engagement with human rights that merits greater examination for its potentially 
significant contribution to µPDNLQJULJKWVUHDO¶Rights-holders and their advocates must feel 
entitled and empowered to make rights claims if human rights are to be a promising route to 
support political and social objectives. We have aimed then, to add a different kind of 
example of what local-level ownership can look like; one that moves towards a richer 
understanding of the drivers and risks to local-level ownership of rights language, and 
provides insights to inform interventions aimed at bringing justice closer for rights-holders in 
local contexts.  
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GHJUDGLQJ¶WUHDWPHQWWKLVLQFLGHQFHZDVFRXQWHGRQO\RQFH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